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ABSTRACT 
Opinion Leaders, Influence Activities and Leadership Rents   
by Kai A. Konrad* 
Consumers may observe previous consumers' choices. They may follow their 
choices if they think these consumers are better informed. In turn, firms may 
concentrate on influencing the early consumers. This, in turn, changes the 
nature of early consumers' choice behavior as a signal for other consumers. In 
this paper, I show that firms' influence activities need not distort earlier 
consumers' decisions, but may reduce the informative value of these decisions 
for other consumers if influence activities are noisy or if some firms have deep 
pockets and others are liquidity constrained. 
 
Keywords:  Opinion leaders, influence activities, promotional competition, leadership, 
deep pockets, liquidity constraints 
JEL Classification: D43, D72, L15 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Konsumentenbeeinflussung und die Konsumentenrenten von 
Meinungsführern bei Produktinnovationen 
Wenn die Kaufentscheidungen früher Konsumenten von nachfolgenden Konsu-
menten beobachtbar sind, können frühe Kaufentscheidungen von wohlinfor-
mierten Konsumenten auch informativ für nachfolgende Konsumenten sein und 
diese zur Imitation früher Kaufentscheidungen veranlassen. Unternehmer ha-
ben deshalb bei Produktinnovationen einen Anreiz, das Kaufverhalten früher 
Konsumenten durch Preisnachlässe oder Werbegeschenke zu beeinflussen. 
Aus diesen Vergünstigungen resultiert für die frühen Konsumenten eine Kon-
sumentenrente. Die Vergünstigungen verändern aber auch den Informations-
wert der Kaufentscheidung früher Konsumenten. In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, 
dass die frühen Konsumenten im Gleichgewicht aus den Vergünstigungen eine 
erhebliche Rente erhalten, ihre Kaufentscheidung aber durch die Vergünstigun-
gen nicht beeinflusst wird und als Signal für nachfolgende Käufer informativ 
bleibt. Das gilt vor allem, wenn die Beeinflussungsaktivitäten der Unternehmen 
effizient sind (z.B. in Form von Preisnachlässen erfolgen), und wenn die kon-
kurrierenden Unternehmen ex-ante in einer symmetrischen Wettbewerbs-
situation sind. Der Beitrag untersucht zudem die Rolle von Budgetbeschrän-
kungen der Unternehmen. Diese erweisen sich für das budgetbeschränkte und 
für das konkurrierende Unternehmen als vorteilhaft. Asymmetrische Budget-
beschränkungen senken aber die Effizienz des Marktergebnisses. 
                                                 
* I thank Helmut Bester, Kjell Erik Lommerud and Robert Nuscheler for discussion and 
comments. The usual caveat applies. 
1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers diﬀer regarding their information about how
valuable is one Þrms product compared to that of another Þrm. Well in-
formed consumers may then act as opinion leaders and market makers. As
they have superior information, they cannot learn from watching others, and
may as well choose early.1 If other consumers can observe their choices, these
other consumers may learn from their choices, and it may be worthwhile to
imitate these choices. Early consumers choices may, hence, determine the
choice of all further consumers, a phenomenon that has been studied exten-
sively as herd behavior or as information cascades.2
A consequence of this is that opinion leaders determine the allocation
of producer rents. Their decision can determine which producer serves the
whole market. Producers are aware of the importance of the market making
function of opinion leaders. Producers may therefore try and inßuence these
opinion leaders consumption choices. They are willing to pay for attracting
the consumption choice of the opinion leader, and their willingness to pay is
mainly determined by the proÞt to be made on the whole market that can
be gained by attracting opinion leaders.
If the information spillovers from early consumers to subsequent con-
sumers exist, one should therefore expect to observe considerable inßuence
activities, targeted at early consumers. Indeed, the literature on diﬀusion of
innovations has identiÞed the special role of opinion leaders (see, e.g., Rogers
1983, Valente and Davis 1999) in accelerating diﬀusion processes by word
of mouth and by imitation of the opinion leader.3 The empirical literature
also establishes that the information status of an agent is a key factor in
whether the agent becomes an opinion leader.4 Further, these opinion lead-
ers are targets of producers inßuence activities. The marketing literature
has emphasized the importance of advertising and sales via opinion leaders,
and textbooks devote chapters on how such strategies could be put in place.
1This is indeed the equilibrium outcome in a waiting game in which all consumers may
get diﬀerent signals about products. An analysis parallels the line of arguments in Bliss
and Nalebuﬀ (1986).
2The seminal papers on herd behavior are Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)
and Bannerjee (1992).
3Leonard-Barton (1981), for instance, studied the adoption of residential solar water
heating. She reported that the strongest predictor of a residents intention to buy was the
number of owners of this technology known by the resident.
4See, for instance, Grewal, Mehta and Kardes (2000), who study car markets and
computer markets. They report that expertise and opinion leadership are signiÞcantly
positively correlated in these markets and conclude that experts tend to become opinion
leaders, or that expertise is an antecedent of both innovativeness and opinion leadership.
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Bribes, gifts, or special rates play a major role as inßuence activities in
this context. Wilkie (1986, p.163), for instance, writes: This strategy re-
quires locating the socially integrated and socially independent consumers
for a particular product category and then promoting the product especially
to them, even giving it to them free. Wilkie also reports a case study where
particular rock music records were successfully promoted by handing out
packages of records for free to a select panel of leaders, asking them for
their evaluations. Similarly, many products which involve some quality un-
certainty, sell with a discount when Þrst introduced in the market. For
instance, aircraft manufacturers grant considerable discounts on early orders
when launching a new type of aircraft.5
Ernest Dichter (1966) already summarized the marketing strategy of a
Þrm using opinion leaders: to identify opinion leaders, and to make them
promote the Þrms products. But Dichter also acknowledges the basic trade-
oﬀ associated with marketing strategies that target opinion leaders. Dichter
(1966, p. 157) argues that information transmission from opinion leaders to
followers works if, and because, the rewards of the leader are purely psycho-
logical and never material: This very assumption - that no material interest
is involved in the recommendation - is the most basic motivation for the lis-
tener in accepting and acting on the recommendation. Inßuence activities
that aﬀect the choice behavior of opinion leaders may distort the signal that
their undistorted choice would give to other consumers, and may make their
choice less valuable as an indicator of product quality.
To illustrate: if a new restaurant opens up, the decision of the Þrst few
customers may induce an information cascade, making all consumers follow
the quality signal that can be deduced from the choices of the early consumers
who make one restaurant crowded and look popular. Hence, the restaurant
owners are motivated to inßuence the decision making, particularly of early
consumers who could induce herding. More precisely, the restaurant owners
may bribe the customers during an opening period. However, does this strat-
egy work if other consumers know that these early consumers are bribed?
The theory developed here also applies to examples where some indi-
viduals are opinion leaders (for whatever reason) and generate one fashion
or another, or bandwagon eﬀects because their choice behavior is imitated.
Such agents are prime targets for inßuence activities, because their decision
is imitated by a large set of individuals, and hence, their decisions allocate a
multiple of the rents they actually generate as the direct consequences of their
own behavior. However, if later consumers consider imitating their opinion
5When Airbus Industries launched its new mega-size aircraft A 380, discounts on early
orders were up to 40 percent (Business Week, March 5, 2001, p.20).
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leaders and know that their decisions were based on superior information,
but also on bribes, should they still imitate them, or perhaps trust their own
judgement?
Summarizing, the research question in this paper is as follows. In the
absence of inßuence activities, consumers with superior information become
opinion leaders whose choices are imitated by other consumers. The leaders
decisions allocate large amounts of producer rents. Firms should therefore
have an incentive to inßuence the decisions of opinion leaders. But this
inßuence may weaken their leadership. If an opinion leader is known to
make a consumption choice because he was bribed to make this choice, the
informational value of his choice may be discounted or eliminated. This, in
turn would make the inßuence activity less proÞtable, or even useless. The
central question this paper is whether inßuence activities occur, how they
inßuence the decision process, and how they allocate rents. Will the better
informed consumer who decides Þrst and who may induce an information
cascade earn a rent? Will inßuence activity be able to destroy the signal
that is provided by the Þrst consumers choice? It will turn out that the
answers depend on the quality of the mechanism through which inßuence
activity aﬀects decisions, and on symmetry properties of the producers. As
the amounts producers would want to spend on inßuence activities in the
equilibrium in a market early on are considerable, deep pockets and liquidity
constraints are of particular importance. Liquidity constraints turn out to
be a useful commitment device, particularly if all producers are constrained,
but they beneÞt producers even if not all producers face liquidity constraints.
The main framework and a benchmark case is set out in the next sec-
tion. Section 3 considers deviations from this benchmark, concentrating in
particular on noisy bribes and on the beneÞts of liquidity constraints or deep
pockets. Section 4 concludes.
2 The opinion leadership framework
I consider two Þrms producing goods a and b, respectively. Further, there
are n consumers, indexed by i. Each of these consumers decides whether to
buy one unit of good a, one unit of good b, or nothing at all. Consumer 1
(she) chooses Þrst; all other consumers choose later.6
Firms per-unit production cost is normalized to zero, and there are no
6This exogenous timing is for simplicity only. Given the assumptions about consumers
product information and about the observability of buying decisions, this timing could
also emerge endogenously in an equilibrium. But to describe explicitly the waiting game
that leads to this outcome is an unnecessary complication.
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capacity constraints. Firms Þrst choose the price of their product charged
to consumer 1. As will turn out, this price will typically be negative in
the equilibrium, as it includes an element of bribes. I will denote what the
Þrms pay to consumer 1 (net of any price received from the consumer) if
she purchases the Þrms product as sa and sb, respectively, and I will denote
these net transfers from producers to consumer 1 as bribes.
Prices for other consumers are chosen when consumer 1 has made her
choice. These prices will be pa and pb, respectively, and the rationale that
guides the choice of these prices is explained in detail below.
Coming to the consumers: there is some uncertainty about the consumers
valuation of the products a and b. All consumers have the same tastes in the
sense that their valuations of the two goods are identical. However, there are
two states of the world. In state A all consumers attribute a value of 1 to
good a and a value of 0 to good b. In state B all consumers attribute a value
of 0 to good a and a value of 1 to good b. The state of nature is uncertain and
producers and all consumers i = 2, ...n attribute ex ante equal probabilities to
the two states. However, consumer 1 privately receives an informative signal.
This signal changes her belief that state A occurs to θ ∈ (0, 1), where θ is a
random variable that, for simplicity, is assumed to be uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. I will assume that only the opinion leader observes the
signal. The producers and the consumers i = 2, ...n do not.
The consumer 1 has an information advantage compared to other con-
sumers, and chooses Þrst. As her choice is observable and may aﬀect other
consumers choices, I will call her the opinion leader. Consider her choice
now. If she chooses a, the Þrm a pays her sa. If she chooses b, Þrm b pays
her sb. The opinion leader can choose at most one of the products.
As Þrms try to inßuence her behavior in order to change future consumers
behavior, they will try to hide the size of their bribes; therefore I will assume
that all other consumers i = 2, ...n cannot observe the value of the bribes
oﬀered to consumer 1.
The incentive to pay the bribe in a clandestine way may also imply that
there could be some value loss in the transfer from the Þrm to the customer,
and I assume that what she receives has a monetary value of sa−²a. Similarly,
if bs bribe sb were paid to her, its value for her would be sb−²b. Here ²a and ²b
are random variables, and I will assume that ²a−²b is a random variable that is
uniformly distributed on the interval [−e, e]. In this section the benchmark
case in which there is random element, ²a = ²b = 0 is considered. The
importance of noise its various intuitive interpretations will be discussed in
greater detail in section 3.
Once the opinion leader has chosen one or the other product, the pro-
ducers choose the price that applies to all other consumers i = 2, ...n. These
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prices are denoted pa and pb, respectively. These further consumers will not
be bribed.7 Other consumers observe consumer 1s choice, but not her true
consumption beneÞt or the bribe. They may, or may not, learn something
from her choice  that is, she may, but need not, really become an opinion
leader. Then the consumers i = 2, ...n make their consumption choice simul-
taneously. This simultaneity is not needed for the results if the consumers
i = 2, ...n do not have private information. However, the simpliÞcation will
be useful when considering the case in which these consumers also have some
private information.
I will Þrst consider a benchmark in which there is no noise.
Proposition 1 For ²a = ²b ≡ 0 and n ≥ 3 there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium such that consumer 1 receives bribes sa = sb = n−12 − 1 and
always chooses a or b according to her signal, the Þrm j ∈ {a, b} whose
product was chosen by consumer 1 chooses a price equal to pj = 1/2, the
other Þrm chooses a price equal to zero, and all further consumers imitate
consumer 1s choice. In this equilibrium, total expected rent is
nE[max{θ, 1− θ}] = 3
4
n.
Consumer 1 receives an expected rent equal to
E[max{θ, 1− θ}] + n− 1
2
− 1 = n− 1
2
− 1
4
and each consumer i = 2, ...n receives an expected rent equal to
E[max{θ, 1− θ}]− 1
2
=
1
4
.
Each producer receives an expected producer rent equal to 1
2
.
Proof: Consider Þrst the consumers i = 2, ...n. Their expected payoﬀs
from buying good a or b depend on their posterior beliefs about the state
of the world. These beliefs can be assumed to be uniform, because all these
consumers are precisely in the same situation. Let α denote their probability
belief that the world is in state A. As producers are uninformed, this belief
cannot reasonably depend on producer prices per se. However, the belief
can depend on combinations of prices and consumer 1s choice of a or b. If
7Their behavior does not cause a similar externality. They do not possess private
information. No one could observe, or would want to, imitate their behavior. One could
allow for inßuence activities with respect to these consumers as well, but this would not
change the payoﬀs as long as these consumers do not have received their own signals.
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consumers i = 2, ...n attribute a probability α to the world being in state A,
then α and (1− α) are the expected gross beneÞts for these consumers from
purchasing either a or b, respectively.
Beliefs must be correct in the equilibrium, but not necessarily out of the
equilibrium. Let the consumers i = 2, ...n assume that sa = sb , and that
the opinion leader made a rational choice on the basis of her information
and the bribes oﬀered to her. The anticipated bribes then neutralize each
other. Hence, given that θ is uniformly distributed and assuming sa = sb,
they conclude that θ ≥ 1/2 if she chooses a and that θ ≤ 1/2 if she chooses
b. As E(θ
¯¯
θ ≥ 1
2
) = 3
4
and E(θ
¯¯
θ ≤ 1
2
) = 1
4
, the consumers posterior beliefs
are
α =
½
3
4
if consumer 1 buys a
1
4
if consumer 1 buys b
(1)
The maximum willingness to pay for each of these consumers (vis-a-vis
not buying at all) for product a and b is limited by this value of α and
(1−α), respectively. They buy one of the products only if their rent is non-
negative, that is, if max{(α− pa), (1− α)− pb} ≥ 0. In this case they buy a
if α−pa > (1−α)−pb and b if α−pa < (1−α)−pb. If α−pa = (1−α)−pb,
they are indiﬀerent. Suppose in this case they buy the product which is more
expensive.8 If the consumers are indiﬀerent and both products have the same
price, consumers may randomize.
Consider now the incentives of the Þrms to set prices for consumers i =
2, ...n. For a given choice of consumer 1, and given anticipated values sa = sb,
the consumers calculate α as in (1). Knowing this, the two Þrms engage in
Bertrand competition. In the equilibrium this leads to a price equal to zero
for the Þrm whose product was not chosen by the opinion leader, and a price
equal to |α− (1− α)| = 1/2 for the Þrm whose product was chosen by the
opinion leader, where the last equality follows from (1).
Consider now the choice behavior of the opinion leader. As the noise
terms ²a and ²b are set equal to zero, she chooses a if θ + sa > (1− θ) + sb,
or, equivalently, if
θ >
1
2
− sa − sb
2
, (2)
and b if the reverse inequality holds. Equality in (2) is a zero probability
event and we can assume any tie-breaking rule for this case without aﬀecting
the results.
Consider Þnally the incentives of the Þrms to choose bribes. At this stage
Þrm a maximizes the following payoﬀ:
8This is the tie-breaking rule that that is typically made in Bertrand games with perfect
substitutes and asymmetric Þrms.
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Πa = prob[θ + sa > (1− θ) + sb](n− 1
2
− sa). (3)
This payoﬀ is the product of the probability that the opinion leader chooses
a for given bribes sa and sb, and the rent that the Þrm earns if the leader
chooses a and, hence, induces all other consumers to choose a. Making use
of the assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the probability
equals
prob[θ + sa > (1− θ) + sb] =
 0 if sb − sa > 112 − sb−sa2 if sb − sa ∈ [−1, 1]
1 if sb − sa < −1
(4)
The rent obtained in this case equals n − 1 times the equilibrium price 1/2
charged to consumers i = 2, ...n, minus the bribe that has to be paid to con-
sumer 1 in this case. This makes use of the assumption that the production
cost were normalized to zero.
The payoﬀ of Þrm b is obtained by replacing subscripts a by subscripts b.
If the Þrms simultaneously maximize these payoﬀs, Þrms reaction func-
tions can be obtained from the Þrst-order conditions. Firm as reaction
correspondence is
sa(sb) =
 sa ∈ (−∞, sb − 1) for sb ≥
n
2
+ 1
2
sa =
n
4
− 3
4
+ 1
2
sb for sb ∈ [n2 − 72 , n−12 + 32 ]
sa = sb + 1 for sb ≤ n2 − 72
. (5)
The second line in (5) represents the Þrst-order condition. For suﬃciently
large sb it is not optimal for a to oﬀer a bribe that could be accepted with
positive probability, but any smaller bribe is optimal. This case is charac-
terized by the Þrst line in (5). For suﬃciently small sb, it is optimal for a to
oﬀer a bribe that is just large enough to make the consumer choose a for all
values of θ. In this case sa = sb + 1 is just suﬃcient, and this leads to the
third line in (5).
The reaction correspondence for Þrm b is obtained by replacing all sub-
scripts a by b and vice versa. The reaction correspondences overlap or inter-
sect at exactly at one point with sa = sb = n−12 − 1 if n ≥ 3. ¤
Proposition 1 considers a situation with an informed consumer who has
the potential of becoming an opinion leader. Firms have an incentive to
bribe this consumer to inßuence the consumers choice, because her choice
can move the whole market. Indeed, if the technology of bribing the opinion
leader is fully eﬃcient, that is, if it is just a transfer of money from the Þrm
to the consumer that does not generate any extra cost or noise, the position
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of the opinion leader is very powerful. She captures almost all the producer
rent that is generated by all sales to future customers.
The result can be used to address Dichters (1966) discussion of the prob-
lem that Þrms should try to inßuence opinion leaders, but that there is a
danger that this inßuence may destroy the channel by which opinion leaders
change the market outcome because their judgement or choice becomes less
valuable or even useless for those who would like to beneÞt from their su-
perior information. If Þrms Þnd eﬃcient ways to bribe the opinion leaders,
then their consumer choice is as informative for future consumers as without
such bribes. However, at the same time, the market outcome is not very
satisfactory from the point of view of producers. They sacriÞce all rent on
selling to consumers i = 2, ...n by bribing the informed consumer.
3 Generalizations and Robustness
Proposition 1 considers a bechmark case. In what follows I will discuss some
of the assumptions of this benchmark case and their importance for the result.
Informed followers. It was assumed in Proposition 1 that consumers i =
2, ...n are completely uninformed. It is evident in this case that they do not
have much to lose by following the opinion leader. This assumption makes
herd behavior particularly likely. Even a bit of information obtained from
observing the leaders choice is better than no information. Therefore, even
if the bribes weakened the opinion leaders signal, this would not make them
rely on their own information, because they have none.
Suppose that all consumers i = 2, ...n also get a signal. Generally, this
will complicate the choice of prices pa and pb, as consumers i = 2, ...n will
update their beliefs on the basis of the observed behavior of the leader and
their own information and the outcome will depend on the characteristics
of the signals. Assume, for instance, that all consumers know they received
exactly the same signal as the opinion leader with some positive probability
µ and a signal that is simply noise with probability (1 − µ). In this case
not much changes. The undistorted leaders action reveals information that
is strictly superior to their own information, and not even the problem of
choosing pa and pb will be aﬀected in the continuation game in which the
leaders choice can be taken as a choice that is fully based on her signal.9
9Admittedly, this conclusion depends on the particular nature of the information signals
assumed here. More generally, the equilibrium will depend on how the followers signals
correlate with the opinion leaders signal.
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Word-of-mouth. Observing opinion leaders choices is one way their supe-
rior information is transferred to other consumers. The marketing literature
emphasizes that opinion leaders consumption choices are only one channel
by which they may transmit their information. Opinion leaders also act as
informal advisors for their friends and neighbours. Bribing may then be more
or less diﬃcult than if the information transmission occurs via observed con-
sumer choices. On the one hand side, it may take less to bribe someone to
give wrong advice, as this does not lead to a personal sacriÞce. The advisor
does not have to consume the inferior product himself. On the other hand,
advice is soft and often not observable or veriÞable from the outside. Hence,
it may be diﬃcult for the Þrm that bribes an opinion leader to make sure
that the opinion leader really recommends this Þrms product. She may take
the bribe and then recommend the superior product anyway, particularly if
the opinion leader cares about her own reputation in a larger context, or if
she feels altruistic with respect to the persons she advises.
To overcome this problem Þrms will need to monitor the opinion leader,
or to make the bribe a function of sales, or to use persuasive advertizing
that makes the opinion leader a true believer. Despite these problems, if
inßuence activities are at work, the basic insights from the previous section
are also likely to hold if the information is transmitted by word of mouth.
Firms will choose symmetric bribes, and hence, the opinion leaders action
is still a function of the signal he received.
Typically, in these cases the inßuence activity cannot be a simple transfer
of money. It is then more likely that the eﬀect of the money spent on inßuence
activities is not deterministic, making the inßuence activity a noisy one.
As noise can also have other sources, I consider this aspect in a separate
paragraph.
Noise. Suppose that the money value from receiving a bribe is not deter-
ministic. Bribes arrive at the recipient only with some noise. For instance, if
the early customers of a new product receive a welcome present, or another
in-kind transfer that is produced by the Þrm, there is some uncertainty about
how a customer will value the gift. The valuation could exceed, but will typ-
ically fall short of, the cost this gift has for the Þrm by some amount ²a and
²b for the two Þrms, respectively, and the deviation may also be diﬃcult to
predict for the Þrm making the gift. Accordingly, the money value received
has some element of randomness or noise. For given bribes by Þrms a and b,
the relevant noise variable is the diﬀerence between ²a and ²b.
We consider the case in which consumer 1 can observe the actual value of
si−²i when she receives the oﬀers for bribes. That is, the consumer knows the
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monetary value she attributes to receiving a particular gift or other beneÞt,
but the Þrms or other consumers cannot observe these monetary values.10
Proposition 2 Let ²A − ²B be uniformly distributed on [−e, e] with e ≤ 1
and ²a, ²b > −12 . For n ≥ 3 a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists such that
the Þrms oﬀer bribes equal to sa = sb = (n − 1)[12 − e
2
6
] − 1 to the opinion
leader, the opinion leader chooses the product according to her signal, the
consumers i = 2, ...n choose the same product as the opinion leader and pay
a price pj = 12 − e
2
6
.
A proof is in the appendix. Proposition 2 looks at the case in which noise
is not very big. The case e > 1 can be analysed along similar lines and
yields qualitatively similar results. The assumption ²a, ²b > −12 is suﬃcient
to make sure that consumer 1 always accepts one of the equilibrium bribes.
It is meant to rule out the uninteresting case in which even a positive bribe
is not attractive enough to make the consumer 1 choose one of the products.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 shows that some noise does not change the re-
sult of the no-noise case qualitatively. The noise makes the opinion leaders
signal less valuable, but does not destroy it. As the signal is less valuable,
the proÞt that is earned from selling to the consumers that follow the leaders
choice is lower, and the equilibrium bribe is therefore reduced. Overall there
is a welfare loss, as the opinion leader makes the wrong choice more fre-
quently than if she just followed her signal, and the consumers who imitate
her behavior replicate this mistake if it occurs.
Deep pockets and liquidity constraints. Let us return to the bench-
mark case without noise. As shown in Proposition 1, opinion leadership
induces Þrms to make considerable up-front payments when trying to attract
the whole market. Firms spend all their future proÞt on early customers who
inßuence later consumers. These up-front payments require deep pockets.
A Þrm that is liquidity constrained cannot spend all of its future proÞts or
a major share of them in a market on initial campaigns, advertisement and
consumer discounts.
There are two issues one can look at. Consider Þrst a symmetric case in
which the two Þrms are equally liquidity constrained and unable to oﬀer the
unconstrained equilibrium bribe. They will both oﬀer the maximum possible
bribe. As long as this is correctly anticipated by the consumers i = 2, ...n, it
will not aﬀect the pricing game, but the early consumer will receive a smaller
10The case in which the actual value of ²i is revealed to the consumer only when the true
state of nature is also revealed is less interesting, as the consumer 1 will make its choice
on the basis of expecteed values of ²i, and this basically eliminates the noise problem.
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bribe. Hence, if both Þrms are liquidity constrained, this beneÞts the Þrms
and harms the early consumer.
Consider asymmetric liquidity constraints. Let one Þrm be liquidity con-
strained, and let the other Þrm have deep pockets. In this case the bribes
oﬀered by the Þrms will not necessarily be symmetric, leading to distorted
consumption decisions by consumer 1. In turn, this will change the informa-
tion that can be extracted from consumer 1s choice. It will turn out that
this makes inßuence activities less eﬀective and reduces, but does not elimi-
nate, the rent transfer to consumer 1. It is also interesting to ask whether a
unilateral liquidity constraint is a strategic advantage or a disadvantage.
Proposition 3 Let Þrm b be cash constrained to sb ≤ 0 and Þrm a be un-
constrained. Let n ≥ 3 and ²a = ²b = 0. Then there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with sa = n−3n+3 and sb = 0. The resulting expected proÞts are
2n2
(n+3)2
for Þrm a and 3n
2−3n
(n+3)2
for Þrm b. The sum of all rents is lower than if
b is not liquidity constrained.
A proof and a calculation of consumer 1s rent are in the appendix. In-
tuitively, Þrm a can choose a positive subsidy such that the Þrst consumer
chooses product a with a probability that is higher than one half, and the Þrm
has an incentive to do this. However, the consumers i = 2, ...n anticipate the
optimal bribe, and that for this bribe the choice of a reveals an information
about θ that diﬀers from the symmetric case. In some cases in which, disre-
garding the bribe, the consumer had a mild preference for b consumer 1 still
chooses a. This reduces the value of the Þrst consumers choice a as a signal,
whereas the choice of b becomes an even more valuable signal. Accordingly,
Þrm as bribe has a positive externality for Þrm b, as it increases this Þrms
equilibrium price. Overall, both Þrms beneÞt from this unilateral bribes, but
Þrm b beneÞts from as inßuence activities by even more than Þrm a. Firm
b ends up with a payoﬀ even higehr than the unconstrained Þrms payoﬀ for
all n > 3.
The asymmetry and the wrong decision this asymmetry causes with
respect to some of consumer 1s choices also cause an ineﬃciency, and the
herd behavior of all other consumers magniÞes this ineﬃciency.
Endogenous leadership. It is plausible to assume that opinion leaders
already exist in a society and are exogenously given for a Þrm that innovates
a new product. However, as opinion leaders capture a large share of rents,
members in a society have an incentive to become opinion leaders and may
have some instruments for achieving this goal. The marketing literature has
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studied the various determinants of opinion leadership. Some of these deter-
minants are social independence and social integration (Wilkie 1986) and are
not really a matter of choice, or at least diﬃcult to change in the short run.11
Another determinant that is well documented to be an important determi-
nant for a consumer to become and act as an opinion leader is the consumers
information or expertise (Grewal, Mehta and Kardes 2000), and this variable
is most obviously endogenous from the point of view of a consumer. Accord-
ingly, at least some persons should have considerable incentives to acquire
information in a society in which opinion leadership matters and generates
a leadership rent. The information acquisition process may dissipate some
or all of the opinion leaders expected rent. But the incentive to acquire
information will also contribute to overcoming the market ineﬃciency that
is typically associated with the public good property of consumers product
information.
4 Discussion
This paper considers markets in which some consumers have an information
advantage about product quality. Such consumers could choose early and,
if their choice is publicly observed, act as opinion leaders and generate herd
behavior on the part of other consumers. Firms that compete for customers
also know which consumer has an information advantage and could therefore
act as an opinion leader. They may therefore approach these consumers and
try and inßuence the leaders choice by bribes. In this paper I show that
eﬃcient bribes do not aﬀect the opinion-leaders choice in the equilibrium.
Hence, her choice has the same value as a signal to further consumers as in
the absence of bribes. However, the bribes shift almost all rent away from
the Þrms and to the opinion leader.
Bribes could potentially distort the signal that the leaders choice could
otherwise give to further consumers. In this paper I show that this becomes
indeed a problem if bribes involve noise. Noise can then reduce the quality
of the opinion leaders choice as a signal. This leads to less eﬃcient market
outcomes in which the followers make an ineﬃcient product choice more
frequently, in which the opinion leader receives lower bribes and also the
Þrms may have lower proÞts in the equilibrium.
Also, asymmetry of Þrms, e.g., with respect to liquidity constraints, can
cause a welfare loss if these Þrms may use bribes to inßuence opinion lead-
11In the medium or long run individuals also make a choice and optimize on their social
and communication network as has been discussed, e.g., in the context of information
diﬀusion (see, e.g., Granovetter 1973, Burt 1992).
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ers consumption choice, and these ineﬃciencies are magniÞed by the herd
behavior that is induced by the opinion leaders choice.
Summarizing, the market outcome with opinion leaders and inßuence
activities puts opinion leaders in a fortunate position. They extract huge
rents. Accordingly, the position as opinion leader is very attractive. In turn,
this may induce individuals to make investments in information acquisition,
and in activities by which they credibly reveal having made these investment
choices. To some extent this eﬀect may counteract the ineﬃciencies that
may prevail otherwise in markets in which product quality is unknown and
investments need to be made in learning product quality.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider Þrst the consumers i = 2, ...n. Their
expected payoﬀs from buying good a or b depends on their posterior beliefs
about the state of the world. These beliefs can be assumed to be identical
for all i = 2, ...n, because all these consumers are in the same situation. Let
α again denote their probability belief of the world being in state A. Then α
and (1− α) are the expected beneÞts for a consumer from purchasing either
a or b, respectively.
Let the consumers believe that sa = sb as before, that consumer 1 made
a rational choice on the basis of her information and the bribes oﬀered to
her, where the actual bribes are not observed by i = 2, ...n. Consider their
expectations. Consumer 1 will choose a if
(θ + sa − ²a)− [(1− θ)− sb − ²b] > 0 (6)
and b if the reverse inequality holds,12 if the participation constraintmax{(θ+
sa− ²a), (1− θ− sb− ²b)} ≥ 0 is fulÞlled. This constraint can be disregarded,
given the limits that are imposed on ²a and ²b in the proposition. I do not
consider this in detail here.
If consumers i = 2, ...n expect sa = sb, then, also using the assump-
tions about uniform and stochastically independent distributions of θ and
of (²a − ²b), they calculate α given that the opinion leader chooses a and b,
respectively, as follows.
Consider E(θ |2θ − 1 > ²a − ²b ). Recall that θ is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, 1] and ²a − ²b is uniformly distributed on the interval
[−e,+e] with e ≤ 1, and θ and ²a− ²b are stochastically independent. DeÞne
12For equality, again any tie-breaking rule will not aﬀect the results, as this is a zero-
probability event.
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x = (2θ − 1). Then
E(
x+ 1
2
|x > ²a − ²b)) = 1
2
+
1
2
E(x |x > ²a − ²b)). (7)
Now consider
E(x |x− (²a − ²b) > 0)) = 1
2e
µZ +e
−e
x(e+ x)dx+
Z 1
+e
(x2e)dx
¶
(8)
=
1
2e
·
ex2
2
+
x3
3
¸+e
−e
+
·
2ex2
2
¸1
+e
=
1
2e
µ
2e3
3
+ (e− e3)
¶
=
1
2
− e
2
6
.
Accordingly, E(θ |2θ − 1 > (²a − ²b))) = 12 + 12(12 − e
2
6
) = 3
4
− e2
12
. Consumers
i = 2, ...n will use this as their updated belief about the probability of the
states of nature:
α =
½
E(θ |2θ − 1 > ²a − ²b)) = 34 − e
2
12
if consumer 1 buys a
E(θ |2θ − 1 < ²a − ²b)) = 14 + e
2
12
if consumer 1 buys b
(9)
Note that this α converges towards 3/4 and 1/4 for e → 0. The maximum
willingness to pay for each of these consumers (vis-a-vis not buying at all)
for product a and b is equal to α and (1− α), respectively. Consumers buy
exactly one of the products if at least one of the prices pa or pb falls short of
the respective critical limit. Accordingly, they buy a if α− pa > (1−α)− pb
and b if the reverse inequality holds. Again I adopt the tie-breaking rule that
is standard in asymmetric Bertrand games that, if equality holds, they all
choose the product with the higher price. If equality holds and both products
have the same price, they randomize.
Consider now the incentives of the Þrms to set prices for consumers i =
2, ...n given the expectations as in (9). The two Þrms engage in Bertrand
competition. This leads to a price equal to zero for the Þrm whose product
was not chosen by consumer 1, and a price equal to |α− (1− α)| = 1
2
− e2
6
for the Þrm whose product was chosen by consumer 1.
Consider next the choice behavior of consumer 1. She chooses a if θ +
sa − ²a > (1− θ) + sb − ²b, or, equivalently, if
θ >
1
2
− sa − sb − (²a − ²b)
2
. (10)
14
The opinion leader chooses b if the reverse inequality holds. The case of
equality is a zero probability event and we can adopt any tie-breaking rule
for this case, without aﬀecting the results.
Consider Þnally the incentives of the Þrms to choose bribes. Firm as
payoﬀ is zero if consumer 1 chooses b. Firm a earns n−1 times the equilibrium
price pa = 12 − e
2
6
from selling to consumers i = 2, ...n if consumer 1 chooses
product a, and has the cost of the bribe sa in this case. This happens with
a probability
πa(sa, sb) = prob[(2θ − 1) + (sa − sb) > (²a − ²b)] (11)
=

0 if sa − sb < −(1 + e)
(1+e+(sa−sb))2
8e
if sa − sb ∈ [−(1 + e),−(1− e)]
1
2
+ sa−sb
2
if sa − sb ∈ [−(1− e), (1− e)]
1− (1+e−(sa−sb))2
8e
if sa − sb ∈ [1− e, 1 + e]
1 if sa − sb > 1 + e
Accordingly, Þrm as payoﬀ can be written as
Πa(sa, sb) = πa(sa, sb)((n− 1)(1
2
− e
2
6
)− sa). (12)
The payoﬀ of Þrm b is obtained by replacing all subscripts a by b and vice
versa. Maximization of these payoﬀs yields Þrst-order conditions that have
a symmetric solution with
sa = sb = (n− 1)[1
2
− e
2
6
]− 1. (13)
¤
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider Þrst the consumers i = 2, ...n . Let
them anticipate bribes s∗a =
n−3
n+3
and s∗b = 0. Taking these values they
calculate their maximum willingnesses to pay for a and b, depending on the
consumer 1s choice. This consumer is expected to choose a if
θ + s∗a > (1− θ) + s∗b . (14)
Using s∗b = 0 and the assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the
expected value of good a for a consumer i = 2, ...n if consumer 1 chooses a
then equals 1
2
(1+ (1−s
∗
a)
2
)) = 3
4
− s∗a
4
. Similarly, if the reverse inequality holds,
consumer 1 chooses b. The expected value of a for the consumers i = 2, ...n
is 1
4
− s∗a
4
in this case. Note that the minus sign here is not by mistake. If
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only Þrm a chooses a positive bribe, this decreases α below 1
4
if consumer 1
actually chooses b. Hence,
α =
(
3
4
− s∗a
4
= 3
4
− 1
4
n−3
n+3
if consumer 1 buys a
1
4
− s∗a
4
= 1
4
− 1
4
n−3
n+3
if consumer 1 buys b.
(15)
Turning to the Þrms choices of pa and pb, suppose Þrst consumer 1 chose
a. Firm b will choose pb = 0 and Þrm a will charge the maximum diﬀerence
that the consumers are willing to pay for a instead of b. This diﬀerence is
pa = 2α− 1 = 12 − s
∗
a
2
. This shows that an increase in as bribe increases the
probability that consumer 1 chooses a, but decreases the equilibrium price
that Þrm a can charge to all subsequent consumers in this case. This causes
a trade-oﬀ for Þrm a.
If consumer 1 chose b, then the other consumers believe that α = 1
4
− s∗a
4
.
Firm a chooses pa = 0 and Þrm b chooses pb = 1 − 2α = 12 + s
∗
a
2
. It is
interesting to note that the price that Þrm b can charge once consumer 1 has
chosen b, is higher the higher the bribe chosen by Þrm a. Hence, an increase
in as bribe decreases the probability that b is chosen, but increases the price
that b can charge to all other consumers in this case.
Consumer 1s choice has already been considered implicitly above.
Coming to the Þrms choice of bribes, the payoﬀ of Þrm a is
Πa = (
1
2
+
sa
2
)((n− 1)(1
2
− s
∗
a
2
)− sa). (16)
Maximization of Πa with respect to sa for sb = 0 leads to a Þrst order
condition 1
4
n − 1
4
ns∗a − 34 + 14s∗a − sa = 0. The implicit function sa(s∗a) that
determines Þrm as optimal bribe as a function of the anticipated bribe oﬀer
has a single Þxed point
s∗a =
n− 3
n+ 3
. (17)
Finally note that s∗b = 0 is optimal among all sb ≤ 0 for this given choice
of s∗a and anticipated choice of s
∗
b = 0 by the consumers i = 2, ...n. The proÞt
of Þrm b is given in this case as
Πb = (
1
2
+
sb − n−3n+3
2
)((n− 1)(1
2
+
1
2
n− 3
n+ 3
)− sb).
Accordingly, dΠb(sb,s
∗
a)
dsb
= 1
2
n2−n−2sbn−6sb−6
n+3
> 0 for all sb < 0 and n ≥ 3.
Hence, among the bribe oﬀers that are feasible for this Þrm, b would want to
choose the maximum bribe s∗b = 0.
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These equilibrium bribes can be used to calculate the equilibrium payoﬀs
of the diﬀerent players. The expected proÞt of Þrm a becomes
Π∗a =
2n2
(n+ 3)2
. (18)
The proÞt of Þrm b becomes
Π∗b =
3 (n− 1)n
(n+ 3)2
. (19)
Accordingly, the liquidity constrained Þrm b has a higher proÞt than the
unconstrained Þrm a for all n > 3.
Consumer 1s payoﬀ equals
(
1
2
− 1
2
n− 3
n+ 3
)× E((1− θ)
¯¯¯¯
θ < (
1
2
− 1
2
n− 3
n+ 3
)) +
[1− (1
2
− 1
2
n− 3
n+ 3
)]×
µ
E(θ
¯¯¯¯
θ > (
1
2
− 1
2
n− 3
n+ 3
)) +
n− 3
n+ 3
¶
.
Simplifying yields 3
2
n2+2n+3
(n+3)2
which is equal to 3
4
as in proposition 1, and
strictly less than consumer 1s rent in proposition 1 for all n > 3. All other
consumers receive their willingness to pay for the supposedly inferior product,
which equals (1−α) = 1
2
n
n+3
if consumer 1 chooses a, and equal to α = 3
2(n+3)
if consumer 1 chooses b.
The reduction in aggregate welfare results from the fact that consumer 1
chooses a with a positive probability even if θ < 1
2
in this equilibrium, and
all other consumers even imitate this ineﬃcient choice. ¤
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